A gênese histórica da paróquia e seu desenvolvimento estrutural em relação à história da Igreja é a problemática central à qual este texto está subordinado. Por esta razão, o texto parte da etimologia do termo paróquia à compreensão de suas origens e matrizes dentro da concepção do cristianismo nascente e em suas raízes bíblicas, sem a pretensão de apresentar críticas e reformulações da estrutura paroquial. O respectivo trabalho toma como alicerce os decorrentes períodos e fatos históricos da Igreja para caracterizar (...) e contextualizar o desenvolvimento da paróquia que, desde os primórdios, está subordinada a estruturas de autoridades eclesiais. O seguinte texto vale-se de documentos importantes que contextualizam a visão, função e organização da paróquia como parte fundamentalmente integrante do corpo eclesial, bem como conceituam juridicamente esta comunidade de fé, célula da Igreja Particular. Após um apanhado geral da genealogia eclesiástica, com o desenvolvimento paroquial no seu interior, o presente trabalho atem-se a contextualizar a visão que a paróquia assumiu dentro da eclesiologia do XXI Concílio Ecumênico da Igreja Católica, o Concílio Vaticano II e do Código do Direito Canônico de 1983 em comparação com o Código Pio-beneditino. Com isso, o presente texto intui proporcionar fundamentos a futuros estudos e questionar a efemeridade. (shrink)

According to standard assumptions in semantics, ordinary users of a language have implicit beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in that language, and they often agree on those beliefs. For example, it is assumed that if Anna and John are both competent users of English and the former utters ‘grass is green’ in conversation with the latter, they will both believe that that sentence is true if and only if grass is green. These assumptions play an important role in an (...) intuitively compelling picture of communication, according to which successful communication through literal assertoric utterances is normally effected thanks to our shared beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences uttered in the course of the conversation. Against these standard assumptions, this paper argues that the participants in a conversation rarely have the same beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences involved in a linguistic interaction. More precisely, it argues for Variance, the thesis that nearly every utterance is such that there is no proposition which more than one language user believes to be that utterance’s truth-conditional content. If Variance is true, we must reject the standard picture of communication. Towards the end of the paper I identify three ways in which ordinary conversations can be communication-like despite the truth of Variance and argue that the most natural amendments to the standard picture fail to explain them. (shrink)

Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either (...) Carla passed the exam or pandas are cute. This paper offers an analysis of speech reports that distinguishes weakenings of what the speaker expressed that yield true reports from weakenings that do not. According to this analysis, speech reports are not only sensitive to the informational content of what the speaker expressed, but also to the possibilities a speaker raises in making an utterance. As I argue, this analysis has significant advantages over its most promising competitors, including views based on work by Barwise and Perry : 668–691, 1981), views appealing to recent work on the notion of content parthood by Fine :199–226, 2016) and Yablo, and Richard’s : 605–616, 1998) proposal appealing to structured propositions. (shrink)

The propositional view of communication states that every literal assertoric utterance of an indicative sentence expresses a proposition, and the audience understands those utterances only if she entertains the proposition(s) the speaker expressed. According to an important objection due to Ray Buchanan, the propositional view is ill‐equipped to handle meaning underdeterminacy. Using resources from situation semantics and MacFarlane's nonindexical contextualism, this article develops a view of literal communication close to the propositional view which overcomes Buchanan's underdeterminacy considerations while accounting for (...) the kind of indifference that typically characterizes speakers' intentions. (shrink)

Objectivo principal do presente artigo é mostrar até que ponto o evolucionismo darwinista inclui proposições centrais testáveis, para além de várias proposições acessórias também elas testáveis. Nesse sentido, o autor constrói um argumento no sentido de mostrar que as alegações de Karl Popper, segundo as quais não pode ser concedido estatuto de cientificidade ao darwinismo, carecem de fundamento. O autor defende também a necessidade de um questionamento firme em relação a todo e qualquer argumento fornecido pela ciência, pois nem a (...) capacidade de previsão nem a universalidade das leis são garantia de que a ciência, também ela, nunca caia em erro. /// Aim of the present article is to show that the doctrine of evolution defended by Charles Darwin is grounded on propositions that are verifiable, as are verifiable many of its secondary propositions. The author builds up an argument that goes in the direction of showing how the allegations by Karl Popper against the scientific nature of Darwinism are not grounded in reality. The author of the article also defends the necessity of a firm questioning in relation to each and every argument advanced by the practitioners of science, since nor its anticipatory capacity nor the universality of its laws are warrant enough that the science never falls into error. (shrink)

In the current world of education, politics and public opinion, musical experience is increasingly threatened. It is designated ever more as an expendable luxury. This kind of general trend has hardly left the thinking in the field of music and music education untouched. Inspiration comes from the technical rationality of our time. This rationality affects an oblivion of ontology. In this article we discuss this trend related to Martin Heidegger’s thinking concerning the human existence in the world, artworks and notions (...) like “being” (Sein) and “oblivion-of-being” (Seinsvergessenheit). We think that it is possible to see this “oblivion-of-being” in relation to the trend in cultural and educational politics as well as in music educational thinking to focus on the instrumental usefulness of learning music. (shrink)

The article Disagreement lost, written by Martín Abreu Zavaleta, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 16 September 2020 without open access. The copyright of the article changed on 18 September 2020 to © The Author 2020 and the article is forthwith distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution.

Cluster randomized controlled trials (cluster RCTs) randomize whole clusters of individuals in testing two or more competing interventions. Here we will present the ethical problems raised by cluster RCTs concerning their effect on inequality. We argue that some inequalities generated by cluster RCTs are larger in scope than those generated from individual RCTs. We also argue that any cluster RCT-generated inequalities, which divide groups rather than individuals, are more problematic in type than the inequalities created in individual RCTs. These concerns (...) should be taken into consideration when designing research at the cluster level, and those conducting the research should consider modified research design strategies in cases where they believe the risk of generating inequalities is large. (shrink)

Scientific practices have been changed by the increasing use of computer simulations. A central question for philosophers is how to characterize computer simulations. In this paper, we address this question by analyzing simulations in biochemistry. We propose that simulations have been used in biochemistry long before computers arrived. Simulation can be described as a surrogate relationship between models. Moreover, a simulative aspect is implicit in the classical dichotomy between in vivo–in vitro conditions. Based on a discussion about how to characterize (...) a simulative aspect in this dichotomy, we will argue that an adequate understanding of computer simulations in biochemistry requires a previous understanding of simulations in experimental contexts. (shrink)

En los años veinte del siglo pasado se constituye lo que luego se llamó la escuela de Cambridge en bioquímica. Bajo el liderazgo de Frederick Gowland Hopkins este grupo tenía como objetivo primario la consolidación de la naciente bioquímica. Una característica particular de este grupo fue el intento explícito de vincular el trabajo científico con la discusión filosófica. Sin embargo, algunos historiadores como Nils Roll-Hansen han cuestionado en duros términos la manera en la cual estos científicos apelaban a la filosofía. (...) En particular Roll-Hansen ha sugerido que los aspectos filosóficos del trabajo de estos investigadores tendrían un mero carácter propagandístico vinculado con el proyecto de la constitución de la bioquímica como una disciplina. En este trabajo voy a defender que es posible considerar a los principios filosóficos presentados por la escuela de Cambridge como algo más que una mera propaganda para un proyecto institucional. Para esto voy a comparar la relación entre los principios filosóficos y trabajo metodológico propuesto por la escuela de Cambridge con una propuesta contemporánea: el Análisis de Control Metabólico, una perspectiva en el estudio de la bioquímica cuyo trabajo metodológico se suele defender apelando a “principios filosóficos”. A pesar de la distancia temporal entre ambas escuelas, tanto la actitud de apelar a principios filosóficos como el campo de estudio científico son semejantes.In the twenties of the last century, the Cambridge school in biochemistry was established. Under the leadership of Frederick Gowland Hopkins this group had as its primary objective the consolidation of a new science: biochemistry. A particular feature of this group was the explicit attempt to link scientific work with philosophical discussion. However, some historians like Nils Roll-Hansen have harshly questioned the way in which these scientists appealed to philosophy. In particular Roll-Hansen has suggested that the philosophical aspects of the work of these researchers would have to be considered as propaganda, motivated by attempt stablish the biochemistry as a discipline. In this paper I am going to defend that it is possible to consider the philosophical principles presented by the Cambridge school as something more than a propaganda for an institutional project. To this end I am going to compare the relationship between the philosophical principles and methodological work proposed by the Cambridge school with a contemporary proposal: the Metabolic Control Analysis, a perspective in the study of biochemistry whose methodological work is usually defended by appealing to “philosophical principles”. Despite the temporal distance between the two schools, both the attitude of appealing to philosophical principles and their field of scientific study are similar. Key Words: Philosophy of Biochemistry; Metabolic Control Analysis; Cambridge School ARK: ark:/s18537960/2ak06yaaq. (shrink)

This paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance’s truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes (...) are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

In this article we propose an analysis of the controversy between Geoffrey Jefferson and Alan Turing in terms of a Kuhnian account of thought experiments. In this account, the main task is not to evaluate intuitions or (only) to rearrange concepts. Instead, we propose that the main task is to construct scenarios by proposing relevant experiences in which shared assumptions and conflicting lines of inquiry can be made explicit. From this perspective, we can understand the arguments and assumptions in the (...) Jefferson-Turing thinking machine controversy. (shrink)